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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-5486 
________________
HARRY L. BIERLEY,
               Appellant
   v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00007E)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 21, 2006
BEFORE: BARRY, CHAGARES and COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: July 24, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Harry L. Bierley appeals pro se an order of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania.  We will affirm.
2I.
In July 1990, Bierley was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Pennsylvania, of aggravated assault for attempting to cause or intentionally or knowingly
causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon.  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).  This offense
is graded as a felony of the second degree.  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(b).  Bierley was
ultimately sentenced to a term of eight to forty-eight months of imprisonment, which he
began serving on August 27, 1990.  
Shortly after completing his sentence in August 1994, Bierley filed an application
for disability insurance benefits.  In September 1996, an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) determined that Bierley was disabled and that he was entitled to benefits as of
August 1993.  Disability payments began in October 1996, and, in March 1997, the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) released past due benefits, including benefits for the
period during which Bierley was incarcerated for the aggravated assault conviction. 
Because, however, benefits could not be paid for any month during any part of which a
beneficiary is incarcerated for a felony conviction, 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (1993), the SSA
notified Bierley that he had been overpaid for the period of August 1993 to August 1994.  
Alleging that his incarceration was illegal, Bierley requested that recovery of the
overpayment be waived.  After unsuccessfully pursuing his claim before the SSA, Bierley
requested a hearing before an ALJ.  In December 2003, the ALJ denied Bierley’s request
for a waiver, finding that he had not demonstrated that his conviction had been overturned
 Generally, we would exercise plenary review over the order granting the1
Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the perceived constitutional claim on the basis of
sovereign immunity and respondeat superior.  See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-
Pennsylvania, 271 F. 3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir.
(continued...)
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and that he was at fault for keeping the entire amount of past due benefits.  The ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council
denied Bierley’s request for review.
In January 2005, Bierley filed a pro se civil action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision.  Bierley, citing various constitutional amendments, also alleged
that the Commissioner used improper criteria to determine whether he was entitled to
benefits.  The Commissioner sought affirmance of the decision below, and moved to
dismiss Bierley’s perceived constitutional claim on the basis of sovereign immunity and
respondeat superior.  On November 14, 2005, the District Court adopted the Reports of a
Magistrate Judge, and granted the Commissioner’s motions.  Bierley appealed. 
II.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
With respect to Bierley’s claim for Social Security benefits, our role is identical to that of
the District Court.  We review the administrative record de novo to determine whether
there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.   See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113,1
(...continued)1
1996).  The substance of this claim is that the ALJ’s “review was not predicated on
proper criteria relating to whether or not the claimant was qualified for Social Security
benefits during the time period for which overpayment is claimed.”  The Magistrate Judge
treated this allegation separately from Bierley’s claim for disability benefits.  Because,
however, Bierley’s argument concerns the legal standards used in determining whether he
was entitled to benefits, we conclude that the claim is more properly construed as a
request for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner under § 405(g).  As such, it
is evaluated under the substantial evidence standard.  With respect to the merits of
Bierley’s claim, we hold that there is substantial evidence that the ALJ applied the correct
statutes and regulations in evaluating Bierley’s request for a wavier of the overpayment. 
4
118 (3d Cir. 2002); Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002).  Substantial
evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999), citing Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).  
III.
At the time of Bierley’s incarceration, the Social Security Act provided, subject to
an exception not applicable here, that “no monthly [disability] benefits shall be paid . . . to
any individual for any month during which such individual is confined in a jail, prison, or
other penal institution or correctional facility, pursuant to his conviction of an offense
which constituted a felony under applicable law.”  42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(1) (1993); see also
Artz v. Barnhart, 330 F.3d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 2003).  As noted above, Bierley was
imprisoned from August 1990 to August 1994 pursuant to a conviction for aggravated
assault, a second degree felony.  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4); 2702(b).  It is clear,
 It appears that upon expiration of the sentence for the aggravated assault2
conviction in August 1994, Bierley remained incarcerated until December 1994 for other
offenses.  The Commissioner did not allege that Bierley was overpaid from August 1994
to December 1994.
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therefore, that Bierley was overpaid from August 1993, the date he became eligible for
benefits, to August 1994, when his sentence for the aggravated assault felony conviction
expired.  2
The Social Security Act mandates repayment of overpayments except where an
individual “is without fault” and “such adjustment or recovery would defeat the purpose
of [Title II of the Social Security Act] or would be against equity and good conscience.” 
42 U.S.C. § 404(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.506.  The ALJ found that Bierley was not
without fault because he knew that he should not have received benefits for his period of
incarceration.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.507(c) (providing that a claimant is at fault in
receiving overpayments when the incorrect payment results from, inter alia, failure to
return a payment which the individual knew or could have been expected to know was
incorrect).  Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.   
The evidence indicates that Bierley knew that the SSA improperly paid benefits for
the period that he was incarcerated.  According to the ALJ who denied Bierley’s request
for a waiver, the SSA notified Bierley that no payment would be made for the period he
was incarcerated.  To this end, Bierley informed the ALJ who initially determined that he
was disabled that he had been incarcerated from August 1990 to December 1994. 
6Presumably aware of the importance of those dates to his benefits calculation, Bierley
later corrected the dates, advising that ALJ that his period of incarceration for the
aggravated assault conviction ended in August 1995, rather than December 1994.  We
acknowledge that the SSA was aware of Bierley’s incarceration at the time it released
past due benefits.  Indeed, the Commissioner concedes that the overpayment was caused
by an “administrative error.”  However, “[a]lthough the Administration may have been at
fault in making the overpayment, that fact does not relieve the overpaid individual . . from
liability for repayment if such individual is not without fault.”  8 C.F.R. § 404.507. 
Bierley claims that at the time of the overpayment he believed that he was entitled
to all the past due benefits because his conviction was illegal.  This argument is
completely without merit.  Even assuming that reversal of a conviction would entitle a
claimant to benefits for the period of his incarceration, an issue that we do not decide in
this case, Bierley’s claim would fail because he did not demonstrate that his aggravated
assault conviction has in any way been set aside.  Rather, Bierley requested that the ALJ
issue a subpoena for his victim’s medical records, which he claims would demonstrate
that his conviction was obtained with the use of perjured testimony.  The ALJ properly
denied Bierley’s request, stating that “issues of criminal liability are outside the ambit of
the Social Security Act and are expressly committed to State jurisdiction.”  Cf. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.946 (“The issues before the administrative law judge include all the issues brought
out in the initial, reconsidered or revised determination that were not decided entirely in
7your favor.”).  
IV.
In conclusion, we find that the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by “substantial
evidence” and that the ALJ applied the correct statutes and regulations in evaluating
Bierley’s request for a waiver.  Accordingly, for the reasons stated, Bierley was not
entitled to a waiver of the overpayment, and we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
